	itized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/10 : CIA-RDP81-01028R000100030008-9 SECRET SCRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	
	INFORMATION REPORT	
COUNTRY	: Germany/USSR DATE DISTR. 23 Feb	52 25
SUBJECT	: The History and Organization of the NO. OF PAGES 10 Kuibyshev Junkers Group	
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THIS DOCUMENT OF THE UNITED AND 794, OF T LATION OF ITS PROHIBITED BY	CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 7893 HE U.S., COOE, AS MAINDED. 115 TRANSMISSION DO REVECT CONTENTS TO ON RECLEIT BY AN UNADVIABILED RESSORTING LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS FRONISITED.	1 25
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USAF review completed.

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

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SECURITY INFORMATION

In this department, which Treiber supervised, projects
for test stands for the engine group were the primary
functions, but other Soviet development was also carried out.
These included pressurized engine test cells and wind
tunnels, and smaller items such as water brakes and various
types of test stands. The assignments were, for the most
part, difficult to accomplish both with respect to performance
required and technical details such as noise dampers, energy
recovery, and measurement accuracies.

personnel issuing these assignments had no concept of what
equipment was necessary to test a turbojet engine unit.

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the engine group.
There, working conditions were poorer than in the aircraft section. Of the derman "specialists", only three at most had worked on the development of jet power plants. The other workers had a fair knowledge of general engineering but not in the specialized fields. The inheritance which the Soviets had received was completely worthless. For example, almost no data were found on the JUMO 012 project.

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measurements of the Ol2 compressor were reproduced from scrap parts and that it was not known whether these parts, such as rotor blades and guide vanes, were from the latest developments or from earlier work. The whole enterprise bordered on technical swindle.

- (e) Conscious of their weaknesses, the responsible directors and supervisors tried to change their activities to fields in which they were more familiar and proffered such projects to the Soviets. The Soviet management accepted these proposals, which were assigned to a group under the direction of Gerlach, but it also insisted on the development of jet power plants.
- (f) Besides the work on the JUMO 012, a new project called the JUMO 022 was started.

 Strictly a postwar development. The compressor for the JUMO 012 had been constructed and was being tested using a steam turbine as a source of power at the time the transfer to the USSR took place in October 1946.

2. USSR (1946-50)

(a) Contrary to their hopes, the "Peace Section", excluding certain of the lesser skilled personnel, was also transferred to the USSR.

the engine group, 25X1 was shipped by train to Krasnaya-Glinka via Kuibyshev, and from there in automobiles to Uprawlentschsky, arriving 6 Nov 46. In this town, most of the personnel were assigned to apartments in various sections; the remainder, for whom apartments were not available, were primitively housed in a housing area on a hill on a bank of the Volga River. Later, those families received apartments in a settlement of wooden houses (called Finnish houses). A total

To minimize social hardships, German workers founded a social security agency and from the funds of this agency all sick people received benefits. By this organization, the minimum living costs of our group were insured. Pensions were paid to widows and survivors of deceased specialists, who prior to my leaving the USSR, did not receive any support from the Soviet Union.

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director of the plant, Col Kusnizoff.

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3. Results and Personalities

(a) One of the results of four years of research work in the USSR was the creation of the JUMO 022. This, with five thousand horsepower, represents remarkable progress for the Soviet Air Force — even if the fuel consumption figures do not attain the standards of British and American power plants of similar output. Furthermore, in these four years a working group evolved from a mixed group of engineers, which, with the experience gained in developing the JUMO 022, and in possession of all necessary theoretical working data, is now in position to develop within a year a modern unit ready for series production and considered satisfactory when evaluated by Western standards.

(b)	
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- could only be judged if one knew the creative efficiency of native Soviet research work. As they did in Germany, the Soviets declared that in the USSR they already had something better and did not need German development. But the great interest of the Air Ministry was not only in the development of the JUMO 022, but also in secondary developments, such as the water brakes which were made there. Drawings of the water brakes had to be made for the Navy, but the Navy had to pay for them; this curious financial arrangement by the Soviets temporarily improved the poor economic conditions of the plant.
- (d) Col Kusnizoff, before his arrival at Kuibyshev, directed a Soviet research institute. Kusnizoff was a winner of the Stalin prize and a member of the Academy. He brought with him to Zavod #2 a small staff of collaborators who, according to their specialities, were distributed to various departments. For example, <u>Kutscharoff</u> worked in the compressor department. The Germans tried several times to discuss the previous working of this group, but received only careful and evasive answers.

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On 20 Apr 49, during a State Test Run, the transmission of the 022 broke and the whole propeller transmission came loose. Cally Deinhardt, and Kutscharoff were in the office when the accident became known. It was even more surprising that the technical experts of the State Test Run Committee acknowledged the opinion of the German materials examination and had the State Test Run repeated. Soviet workers had no responsible positions before September 1950 at Zavod #2 nor were they permitted to work independently either on test stands or in fabrication. It is improbable that the research group there can exist without the German engineers. If all Germans were repatriated by the end 1951, as the Soviets had declared, then other research agencies must exist elsewhere in the USSR. Maization of the Junkers Group at Kuibyshev Enclosure (C) shows the organization of the Germans and the leading personaltities of each department. This structure was finally developed by trial and error. Oleschnowitsch was the first Soviet director of the plant, but was later replaced by Kusnizoff; this change had little effect on the plant's operation. The Soviet management had contact with the Soviet Air Ministry and there was also a permanent plant representative from that body. In addition, there were Communist Party and Labor Union offices at Zavod #2; each of these were actively connected with the operations of the plant. Soviet Personalities (1) Cleschnowitsch:		SECRET
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on the Jumo 004 engine, having worked on its development

during World War II. At Zavod //2 he was in the Power Plant

Kervin was well qualified

25X1

25X1

(a)

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/10: CIA-RDP81-01028R000100030008-9 SECRET 25X1 SECURITY INFORMATION -9-25X1 names of some of the Askania Testing Department. Group who had traveled Their names are as follows: 25X1 : Worked on control problems. "Spiritual Moeller leader" of Askania personnel. Chief of the Group Associate of Pfeiffer Dr Pfeiffer: Ornamuender: : Oscillograph Specialist Mueller 5. Motes concerning fabrication possibilities of Zavod #2 Enclosure (A) is a sketch of the general layout of Zavod #2. This is not drawn to scale 25X1 In addition to those installations 25X1 shown, there was a social club building next to the plant's entrance. To the west of the social club was an area in which equipment brought from Germany was stored, packed in the original shipping crates; one item included in this packed equipment was the pressurized engine test cell from Junkers/Dessau. The whole plant area was surrounded by a wooden fence 2.5 to 4 meters high. Watchtowers were spaced along the fence and manned day and night; these watchtowers are the "Landmarks of Russia". The U-shaped building (Point No 4) to the south of the main shop housed the general administration offices on the upper floor and various other activities (barber shops, etc) on the lower. To the east were located the compressor building (Point No 5), carpentry and forge shops which contained annealing and hardening furnaces, two pneumatic hammers, and several "friction" presses of which only one was in operation. (s) All machinery had been brought from Junkers/Dessau and BMW/Stassfurt. 25X1 Because of tool limitations, parts had to be designed as simply as possible from a fabrication standpoint. rotor blade being as follows: The blanks are die-forged, 25X1 (d) milled on copy machines and finished by hand. The copy milling machine was made from an old lathe with the pattern running on one spindle and the blank on another. A feeler on the master blade determined the cut on the blank. Longitudinal movement of the miller was automatic. The milled blade was very rough and was finished by hand filing. A large percentage of blades were rejected. For each rejected blade the German responsible had 150 rubles deducted from his wages. This amounted to about 50 working hours' salary. Steel stator blades were made in the same manner.

(e) A special cutting tool was devised for forming the blade root slots in the turbine guide vane rings. This consisted of bronse electrodes having the same shape and size as the blade roots. These electrodes burned through the rings in an oil bath. The bronze were out very quickly and each electrode was good for only about five operations. They were milled from bar stock and finished by hand.

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(f) The limited facilities made the plant primarily a large machine shop. It had no large scale production possibilities with the equipment installed

In fact, the fabrication possibilities were so limited that the same blading was used in several stages of the compressor to cut down the complications of production.

25X1

25X1

-end-

ENCLOSURES:


(A) Zaved #2

Page 1 - Layout

Page 2 - Legend

- (B) Engine Test Stand
- (C) Organization Chart

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LEGEND

POINT 1: NEW TEST STAND BUILDING Started in 1946; still not operating in 1950.

POINT 2: TEMPORARY TEST STAND Built in 1946

POINT 3: DESIGN OFFICE

A

POINT 4: ADMINISTRATION BUILDING, WORK PLANNING, PLANT MANAGER

POINT 5: CARPENTRY SHOP

POINT 6: TEST STANDS FOR EQUIPMENT (pumps, etc) AND COMBUSTION CHAMBERS

POINT 7: MAIN ASSEMBLY SHOP

POINT 8: SHEET METAL WORKSHOP

POINT 9: HEATING PLANT

POINT 10: ASKANIA SECTION

POINT 11: NETALLURGY BUILDING

POINT 12: ENTRANCE AND GUARD HOUSE

POINT 13: COMPRESSOR TEST STAND

POINT 14: STOREHOUSE

POINT 15: PRISON

POINT 16: STOREHOUSE

POINT 17: STOREHOUSE

POINT 18: STOREHOUSE

POINT 19: AMBULANCE GARAGE

POINT 20: UNKNOWN

POINT 21: ELECTRO-MOTOR REPAIR SHOP

POINT 22: REPAIR SHOP BUILDING

POINT 23: FENCE

POINT 24: WATCHTOWERS

POINT 25: GASOLINE STORAGE TANK

POINT 26: SMALL REPAIR SHOP - CHECKING OF MEASURING INSTRUMENTS

POINT 27: FIRE STATION - ONE VEHICLE

POINT 28: AIR COMPRESSOR

POINT 29: ANNEALING BUILDING

POINT 30: FORGE

ENCLOSURE (A)

tries 5

of 2 pages.

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